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Which Strategy for CSDP? 
Jean-Paul Perruche 
General Perruche identifies which elements 
would be required to craft a strategy for the 
EU’s  Common  Security  and  Defence 
Policy, and why in the EU this exercise is 
particularly difficult. 
If we refer to the definition of what a strategy is 
when  it  comes  to  defence  and  security,  the 
following requirements emerge: 
 
1. Identification of the political objectives to be reached. 
This  implies  a  common  vision  of  the  global 
security  context  and  of  the  EU’s  security 
interests (which must include the common and 
specific  interests  of  the  individual  Member-
States).  Considered  from  various  perspectives 
(geography,  economy,  security…)  this  must 
lead  to  a  common  definition  of  the E U ’s 
ambitions.  That  requires  answering  the 
questions: what, how and where? This includes 
the  necessary  level  of  the  EU’s  autonomy  of 
action,  partnerships,  the  transatlantic  link, 
relations with the neighbouring countries etc.  
 
2. Identification of effects to be achieved in order to 
answer  to  our  security  requirements.  As  an 
example,  the  2008  French  White  Book 
mentions:  anticipation,  prevention,  protection, 
intervention and deterrence. 
 
3.  Definition  of  the  combination  of  actions  to  be 
undertaken  and  of  the  required  assets  and 
capabilities. A roadmap must list the types of 
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action to be undertaken within an appropriate 
time frame; of course, this global action plan 
should  be  flexible  enough  to  be  adapted  to 
new events.  
 
Applying  this  definition  to  the  EU,  it 
immediately becomes clear that the Union has 
a  long  way  to  go  to  establish  a  strategy  for 
CSDP.  
 
Political Objectives 
The definition of clear political objectives for 
CSDP has proved very difficult.  
 
First  of  all,  Member  States  have  divergent 
views  on  the  end  goal  of  the  European 
construction.  Those  who  are  motivated  are 
neutralised by those who want a low key EU. 
 
Second,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  restricts  EU 
competences  regarding  CSDP,  which  is 
embedded exclusively in CFSP. Consequently, 
the natural and necessary link between defence 
issues  related  to  vital  interests  and  the 
consequences  of  external  security  issues,  does 
not exist. The core responsibility for defence 
stays with the Nations and NATO, while the 
EU is limited to crisis management outside its 
territory, even though de facto the EU is going 
to be concerned more and more by defence 
aspects  through  its  neighbourhood  policy, 
maritime  surveillance  or  the  fight  against 
terrorism. This situation is detrimental to the 
relevance  of  CSDP,  as  the  EU  is  not  only 
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prevented from acting in the area of defence 
but also from discussing defence issues in an 
EU format. That means that CSDP is expected 
to play only a complementary role in defence 
and  security,  as  if  these  issues  were  too 
important to be dealt with in the EU. It is quite 
schizophrenic  to  look  for  more  European 
integration  of  assets  and  capabilities  and 
simultaneously  decouple  the  competence  for 
security from that for defence.  
 
Third,  convergence  between  EU  Member 
States  in  foreign  policy  is  difficultly  achieved 
since the external action of the EU is but little 
linked  to  their  vital  interests.  It  is  easier  to 
create a common approach and to motivate the 
Member States to defend their most important 
interests  together  when  the  geographic  or 
economic  link  is  more  obvious,  than  to  look 
for this in the area of long range foreign policy, 
where  national  interests  are  so  diversely 
affected.  It has been easier to find agreement 
and contributions to the EU operation in the 
Balkans or in Georgia than to those in Africa or 
more  recently  in  Libya.  This  highlights  the 
weakness  of  the  solidarity  between  Member 
States  when  it  comes  to  launching  EU 
operations.  
 
Fourth,  the  lack  of  a  common  approach  is 
reflected in the difficulty to define priority areas 
for  foreign  policy.  Budgets  do  not  reflect 
strategic priorities but rather the delineation of 
competences between the Commission and the 
Council. €5,7 billion is allocated for the external 
action  of  the  Commission,  but  only  €400 
million  for  CSFP.  There  is  no  unity  of  view 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Member 
States,  and  cooperation  between  the 
Commission,  under  the  control  of  the 
European  Parliament,  and  intergovernmental 
CFSP/CSDP  structures  remains  difficult,  in 
spite  of  the  recent  establishment  of  the 
European  External  Action  Service  under  the 
leadership of the High Representative / Vice-
President of the Commission. 
 
Fifth, it is difficult to marry EU and national 
perspectives. There is agreement on values and 
on  general  principles  (human  rights, 
democratic  rules…)  but  divergence  of 
motivation,  interests,  accepted  costs,  the 
acceptance of risk etc. in EU initiatives. The 
level  of  ambition  of  the  EU  cannot  be  the 
result  of  the  simple  addition  of  the  national 
ambitions of its Member States. 
 
Finally,  EU  actions  and  operations  lack 
visibility,  because  Member  States p r e f e r  t o  
show their national efforts rather than the EU 
image.  
 
Effects 
As Member States have divergent views on the 
political  objectives,  there  cannot  be  but  a 
similar divergence on the effects to be realized 
to  achieve  the  agreed  political  objectives 
(Russia,  the  Middle  east,  Africa,  Kosovo, 
Libya…).  
 
Anticipation would require to strengthen the EU 
capacity to follow the world security situation 
and  a  better  integration  of  intelligence. 
Prevention  would  require  to  have  an  effective 
early warning system, a policy of cooperation 
in  defence  and  security  (SSR/DDR),  border 
surveillance,  a  reaction  force  for  natural  or 
man-made  disasters  etc.  Protection,  of 
population  and  critical  infrastructure,  would 
require specific capabilities to be streamlined at 
the EU level. Intervention: the desired level of 
EU  autonomy  in  crisis  management  should 
serve  as  reference  to  define  the  minimum 
military and civilian capability requirements.  
 
Actions  
The  lack  of  a  strategic  approach  in  the 
definition of the objectives of CSDP entails a 
difficulty to define, plan and implement, in a 
proactive  manner, t h e   necessary  combination 
of actions or course of actions. It also prevents 
an effective definition of the appropriate assets 
and  capabilities  the  EU  should  be  equipped   3 
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with.  This  in  turn  affects t h e  E U ’s 
comprehensive  approach,  the  effectiveness  of 
which is hampered due to the restrictions on 
EU competence in defence matters.  
 
Conclusion 
What can be done to improve this situation? 
And what are the limits?  
 
First, on the basis of an analysis of the national 
white  books  (of  France  and  the  UK,  among 
others)  it  can b e  assessed  what  can  be  done 
collectively at the EU level and what cannot.  
 
Second,  one  can  define  what  can  be  done 
strategically  within  the  area  of  competence 
accorded to the EU by the Lisbon Treaty. Then 
the  initiatives  to  be  taken  to  give t h e  E U  a  
strategic approach in CSDP can be listed.  
 
Third, more coherence between external action, 
CFSP and CSDP must be ensured.  
 
Finally, the EU’s identity must be strengthened. 
The  overall  EU  interest  must  be  taken  into 
account in each national decision in the area of 
security, and national citizens must be informed 
accordingly  so  that  gradually  they  become 
European citizens as well. 
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